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Conversations are currently underway at several levels concerning
comparative analysis of gender relations: gendered welfare states, gender
regimes and the class-gender nexus. These discussions are occurring around
important theoretical, methodological and empirical matters about changes in
workplaces, social security and households. This paper advocates for the insights
revealed through the class-gender nexus approach.
All are asking: is the priority for comparative gender regime analysis a
refined classification scheme for welfare states or should we challenge the
purpose of such classification itself? Also at stake are what may be described
methodologically as ‘thin’ versus ‘thick’ comparative accounts. The ‘thin’
accounts are troubled mainly by which countries fit which welfare state regime
typologies2 whereas ‘thick’ ones are concerned about deeper issues of complex
relational practices within countries.3 What can be revealed through the use of
these methodologies about changing practices in post-industrial societies?
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s classic work on the three worlds of welfare
capitalism was about the issue of the de-commodification of labour by which he
meant freedom from the labour market and reliance upon state-based rights.
These three regimes were liberal where services are provided by markets which
means they vary by individual success in labour markets; conservative where
subsidies, not services are provided to the needy thus making it difficult for
women’s labour force participation and promoting principal male breadwinners;
social democratic promoting social rights and women’s labour force participation
by way of providing services for care work. His recent work offers an
institutional framework of welfare regimes that are an interaction of composite
parts: labour markets, the family and the welfare state. According to him, all
nations have combinations of each part but different ‘accents’: the Liberal Anglo-
Saxon nations are “market-biased”, the Southern European or Japanese are
“powerfully familialist” and then there are the Scandinavians’ welfare states. In
terms of the six nations I have selected to explored in my studies, Australia,
Canada and the United States are characterized as identical in Esping-Andersen’s
scheme with little labour market regulation, residual welfare states and non-
familialist. Sweden is the outlier with medium labour market regulation, a
universal welfare state and non-familialist. Germany and Japan share social
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insurance welfare states and familialism but differ on the extent of labour market
regulation with Germany strong and Japan medium.4  
A key example of a thick analysis is O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver’s book
on four liberal societies entitled States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism
and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. They
extend their analysis beyond welfare states per se to “social policy regimes”
which include reproductive rights. For them, regime “indicates something
broader than the ‘welfare state’, connoting the full range of domestic policy
interventions as well as broader patterns of provisioning and regulation”
including “sexual and reproductive relations.”5 They choose to examine these
issues deeply in terms of practices and policies in four nations rather than
narrowly across 20-odd nations so common for those using statistical
comparisons with data from the Luxemburg Income or Employment Studies, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or the International
Labor Organization. 
Sylvia Walby is a major advocate for gender regime analysis. She sees “a
gender regime as composed of a set of inter-related domains of employment,
unpaid work, the state, male violence, sexuality and culture. This broadens the
concept of the state and adds male violence, sexuality and culture.”6 Her
formulation is much wider than the notion of a gendered welfare-state regime
but less nuanced in terms of class relations. Walby is also advocating the ‘thicker’
kind of evidence such as used by O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver. All of these
research strategies should be regarded as valuable but different ways to address
class and gender matters in relation to transformations in welfare states and the
world of work in advanced capitalist societies.7 
In a preliminary way, the remainder of this paper will illustrate some key
features of a class-gender nexus approach that differentiate it from either the
comparative welfare state or gender regime approaches. This approach will
attempt to cut across the thin/thick divide which has limited much of the
comparative welfare state literature by locating the research focus in relational
terms rather than as attributes of institutions or individuals. The major
interveners in these discussions now all recognize the importance of ‘family’ in
their understandings but they vary in their prioritization of gender and class.
Much of the discussion here will focus on households since they are the least
problematized feature of the triad within the comparative welfare state literature.
I use the designation ‘households’ rather than ‘families’ because this broader
category offers a complex site for investigation more open than a set of
institutions suggested by the designation ‘family’. As will be evident, I am
suggesting a wider consideration of family commitments, obligations and
residential arrangements than typical of a ‘nuclear family’. First, I provide a brief
note about the context for these connections. 
44   JUST LABOUR vol. 4 (Summer 2004)
GENDER AND GENERATIONS
Generation has taken on greater significance because people are living
longer, having fewer children and labour market entry is changing. Moreover,
‘youth’ (those falling between sexual maturity and economic independence) have
grown and are experiencing unique labour market ‘choices’: greatly extended
education, ‘freeters’ and reduced opportunities for career jobs.  ‘Freeters’ are a
new generation of Japanese young people who have not continued in school and
have not had access to core career jobs but support themselves with only part-
time, temporary work, now accounting for over a fifth of the population 15 to 34
years of age (not including students and housewives).8 We now learn that even
young Japanese adults who do gain career jobs are experiencing a tremendous
intensification of work because there are so few of them, especially those with
computer skills, carrying a greater burden of work so they are being burned-out
by job pressures. Instead of being ‘mentored’ and ‘brought along’ the ‘burnt-out’
generation is thrust into overload situations.  
Gender and generation have not transformed in the same manner
everywhere. Helga Krüger reports, “For the United States, Gerson (1993)
classified the intergenerational differences between parents in the sixties and
their adult children as a ‘gender revolution.’ The results of our similar research
revealed that in Germany one should speak not of a gender revolution but of
‘suffocated social change.’”9 Krüger seeks to expand, “our understanding of the
low female labour-market-participation rates in Germany. The faltering nature of
social change reveals that, in the postwar generation, we witnessed a high female
interest in employment among married women set against the traditional and
publicly shared view of their husbands on wives’ conduct. In the generation of
their sons and daughters, these norms had completely changed, but the
bargaining process between couples nevertheless resulted in similar traditional,
gendered, life-course patterns because of women’s systematically lower
resources for financial independence. Norms did change, but not the gendered
segmentation of the pathways from school to work and the segmentation of the
labour market inherited form the early-twentieth-century period of
industrialization. These segmentations connect to a welfare-state regime based
on a conventional family structure, with a wage-earning husband and home-
bound, care giving wife (whose unpaid labour significantly reduces public
schooling, kindergarten, and health-care costs). Clearly, social change in gender
norms has come not with a bang but a whimper.”
THE CLASS-GENDER NEXUS
The class-gender nexus has three principle cornerstones: within
households, workplaces and civil society. The sites themselves are complex
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formations: households include the division of labour between the sexes and
generations. Generations remain critical—parents and children multiplied to
include the experience that shaped a person’s formative years, the demands on
their working lives and the requirements of dependent children and parents.
How households connect to and limit or empower people’s encounters with
work places and civil society is the often invisible but critical factor for the class-
gender nexus. Nations experiences a variety of immigrants, regions, times, etc.
which all affect the national and international class-gender nexus and its
transformation.
One of the most salient issues of our times in advanced post-industrial
societies is how to respond to the changing world of work. How work is
rewarded, organized, distributed and even recognized is rapidly changing. These
changes have their roots in work itself, that is, the types of work required by
post-industrial societies. They also have roots in changes in the supply of
workers through new household forms. Not to be forgotten are changes in the
state both as employers and sustainers of households through services such as
health care, eldercare, childcare, etc. All these developments are themselves
embedded in major changes in nations where they ‘fit’ in the world. This is the
backdrop for my study of six nations, each with a distinct ‘place’ in the world
and representing key stages for broad processes to unfold. 
HOUSEHOLDS AND GENDER ARRANGEMENTS
Household labour includes cross-gender and cross-generation issues; that
is, the sex division of care for children and the elderly. Indeed it includes the care
of three generations: children, the parents and the parent’s parents looked at
from the point of view of the parent’s generation. Care also includes the
maintenance and sustenance of households besides those requirements specific
to the children and parent’s parents. The focus is on the allocation of
responsibilities for care.
I identify five general models of gender arrangements with sub-
variations:
1.   Family Economy based on self-employment encompassing family members;
2.  Male-breadwinner/female-carer whereby women may work for pay so long
as they continue to deliver the lion’s share of care work. Typically this means
part-time paid work for women and the continuation of ‘housewife’
responsibilities; 
3. Dual-carer/career whereby both partners have full-time careers and jointly
provide care work through a combination of leaves, outside the relationship
provisioning and employment flexibility, whether sponsored by state
regulations, employment entitlements or extended family;
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4. Single-parent households with tremendous variation in labour force
participation, ranging from an astonishing 87 per cent of single mothers
working in Japan10 to 68 per cent of lone parents with children below six years
of age in paid employed in Canada and the United States to 30 per cent in
Australia; 
5. Single-person households with variations between men and women, roots
and roofs.
In Japan, the male-breadwinner model is often evident with young
women starting employment after schooling in jobs that do not have careers,
exiting upon marriage and often re-entering the labour market inside the family
economy (as in model one, often including the extended family) or as ‘part-time’
workers. Care for parents remains a major household task in Japan. About a fifth
of non-agricultural employment in Japan is accounted for by self-employed and
family members. About 11 per cent of Japanese women and 13 per cent Japanese
men are self-employed but family workers account for 12 per cent of employed
women outside agriculture (compared to only 2 per cent of men).11 The examples
of single-person households for Japanese day labourers and transfer workers can
be used to demonstrate that households are more about ‘roots’ than ‘roofs’. Roots
are about obligations and entitlements to others, independent of whether they
live ‘under the same roof’. Within the triumvirate of household, employment and
state policies, households are typically absent for day labourers. In Japan a
distinction is made between ‘homelessness’ in the sense of ‘rooflessness’ and
‘rootlessness’ which means detached from traditional home life.12 In Japan, a
household is a ‘registered domicile’ so to be without household is to be free from
obligation (and status, standing and support).13  Most day labourers either have
rejected or been expelled from their households; that is, they are not only roofless
but rootless. Ironically, many core workers in Japan (who are overwhelmingly
men) who appear to be in stable jobs are transferred in mid-career for extended
periods (three to five years) away from their families (tanshin funin). These
transfer men appear to ‘live on their own’ as single households but in fact are
financially and socially attached to the ‘main house’, usually in male-
breadwinner/female carer relationships. Wives remain ‘at home’ to care for
children’s education, the household and dependent adults (often the husband’s
parents). Those transferred may be sent to branch operations, suppliers or other
firms obliged to the parent company. Roots are particularly relevant for
obligations to the elderly—what responsibility does one have caring for their
parents? And for children one no longer ‘lives with’. They may return to the
household or be entitled to covering their advanced education costs. Such
practices differ greatly between regimes where the state covers advanced
education costs (as in Australia, Germany or Sweden) contrasted to those with
higher expectations of family contributions (as in Japan, Canada and the United
States). In Canada there is a trend toward returning to ‘the nest’ for young
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people. Among those 20-24 years, a greater share of young men in 1996 lived
with their parents (74 per cent compared to 69 per cent in 1981) than young
women (67 per cent of compared to 60 per cent in 1981).14 
Seldom do unmarried young Japanese women live ‘on their own’. Young
women’s initial labour force entry is not into a career channel job and they have
an extended ‘youth’ by remaining inside their parent’s households. ‘Office
Ladies’ is a common status for unmarried Japanese women (about a third of all
women in the labour force), a status which includes living with her parents, thus
lacking responsibility for domestic costs. As recently as 1991, three-quarters of
unmarried women in their 20s in Tokyo lived with their parents and few of these
contributed to the household economy.15 This gives ‘Office Ladies’ financial and
work-place freedom (albeit not much personal freedom or independence). The
phenomenon is wider, however, with about three-fifths of all single men and
four-fifths of single women between 20 and 34 living with their parents, giving
rise to the expression “parasite singles.” This is extending to an entire “parasite
generation” as “parasite couples” who are married often move in to live off their
parents. All this reflects the inability to form independent households.16
Germany is the paradigmatic case of the male-breadwinner model. It is
important to note, however, that especially in working-class households women
have been required to contribute through wage work with limited relief for
domestic work. Middle-class households in Germany often employ immigrant
women in order to sustain dual careers.  Sue Yeandle reports for Germany that
“the use of the paid labour of women outside the family to provide childcare,
cleaning and other domestic services by families that have dual earners, usually
both in professional or managerial jobs, is an especially important source of
polarization between women in societies where the state has not accepted
responsibility for enabling parents to participate in the labour force.”17 
In contrast, Sweden is the strongest example of a state-supported dual-
career model with entitlements based upon state regulations and ‘earned’ labour
market provisions. Eligibility requires working for eight months prior to a child’s
birth and support based on a proportion of salary.18 Ironically, since it is mainly
women who still deliver the care, Swedish women often work ‘part-time’ and are
on leave from work but with income supplements and benefits. The careers of
Swedish women are marked by the effects of these practices in terms of limited
promotion through middle-class careers. Even Swedish men who choose to
participate in paternity leave are negatively affected in their careers.19
Nevertheless, Sweden is the closest to a dual-carer model with provisions
designed to ‘freely compel’ fathers to share in childcare. Household help is
seldom hired in Sweden. Most support is delivered by parents through state-
sponsored programs.  In the United States, middle-class households are able to
afford care arrangements supporting market-sustained dual-careers. This creates
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a substantial underclass of hired domestic workers and the development of low-
wage service activities. 
Not all household structures are the same. Single parenthood matters,
especially in the United States where a quarter of all parents are lone parents,
with half of the lone-parent women with children under six working full-time, 17
per cent part-time and only a third ‘not working’; this differs from the pattern in
Germany where a tenth of all parents are lone-parents and for lone-parent
women, a quarter work each of full-time and part-time but over half are ‘not
working’.20 In Japan, nearly 90 per cent of single mothers are employed. A
tremendous insight into Japanese society is provided by Ezawa and Fujiwara
through this lens: “the idea that the Japanese welfare regime emphasizes family
responsibility and maternal care to children only applies to wives who have
husbands. Mothers without husbands (i.e. lone mothers) have traditionally not
been able to dedicate themselves to child rearing. In other words, the Japanese
policy emphasis on family responsibility is concerned with the role of the wife,
not of the mother.”21
In Sweden and Japan, nearly all mothers of children for their first
eighteen months are full time in the home. Elsewhere, new mothers tend to
quickly return to work, especially in the United States where only half the infants
are exclusively cared for by their parents and a fifth spend over an average of 40
hours a week in outside-the-home care. But Sweden and Japan are far from the
same. Japanese mothers quit their jobs to give birth. Swedish mothers work in
order to give birth: they are on work-based leaves, still technically part of the
paid labour force, returning to their careers. Japanese women leave marginal jobs
(often as ‘‘Office Ladies’’) and return to marginal jobs (often in family firms or as
so-called ‘part-time’ workers). Diane Sainsbury identifies what she calls the
“greatest paradox” whereby 95 per cent of Swedish infants are exclusively cared
for by their parents compared to 55 per cent in the United States.22
Some notes of caution: class matters in terms of the character of the
relationships, especially for market-driven care; these are models and individuals
can move between them over time, as the Japanese example reveals; family
economy arrangements are often based upon patriarchy but may be organized
symmetrically; as the Swedish case illustrates, there may be a stronger
commitment to dual careers than to dual caring, thus retaining some features of
the ‘female-carer’ model.
THE INTERSECTIONS TRIAD23
As suggested, my approach focuses on the practices of social welfare,
paid work and unpaid work as located in citizenship entitlements, markets and
households. Within each and through its relationships to the others I seek to
discover the class-gender nexus. Households include the ‘long family’ from
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childhood to pensioners while labour markets include the active period but also
work-based pensions and all forms of ‘leaves’ which follow. Child-care is not
only for pre-school children but for after-and-before care for school-age children
as well---who takes responsibility (i.e. who can both respond and have the
ability) for caring for all childrearing needs from education to taxiing to
nurturing. All this occurs in a post-industrial economy which demands that
women work to support their families and households.
The six relationships between the three sites are not boundaries but
blurred and inter-connected spheres. Households include domestic labour,
families and unpaid community work (volunteers). They are associated with the
relations of reproduction and maintenance/supply-side. Labour Markets include
paid work (market work) and relations of production/demand-side. Social
Policy involves citizenship entitlements, communities and welfare state
regimes/regulation. They are all classed, gendered and generational but in
different ways; that is, in ways that enhance or undercut the class-gender nexus. 
1. Households to Labour Markets          
2. Labour Markets to Households
3. Labour Markets to Social Policy            
4.    Social Policy to Labour Markets
5. Social Policy to Households          
6.   Households to Social Policy
We can use the example of care to illustrate some of the complex
intersections represented by these relationships. As ‘care’ (childcare, eldercare,
sickness care, disability care, and household maintenance) is recognized as a
collective (5) or commodified (2) service rather than individual responsibility
there is an expansion in the paid labour market of caring jobs (1), either in the
4
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private or public sectors. As benefits from employment expand to cover care
work in the home (2) for young children or needy family members, more
household work becomes ‘paid’. This can occur through citizenship entitlements
(5), commodification (1) or work-based entitlements (2). Population/immigration
(4) or family (5) policies can drive the social welfare policies to reinforce or
strengthen birth rates, especially when shortages occur in the labour market (3)
or households can no longer cope with excessive care demands (6). If childcare or
eldercare benefits are provided as a social service, then public sector jobs are
created; if childcare benefits are cash, then private sector jobs result (either in
households, including by parents themselves released from the labour market by
paid leaves, or labour markets). One major difference is the quality of jobs in
private and public daycare arrangements, including benefits for workers, such as
maternity leave (2). The significance of generation at all points of care is made
transparent by this exercise. The illustration could be drawn-out further but it
introduces why the entire ‘web’ or context of these sites should be taken into
account in a holistic analysis of the class-gender nexus. The interaction and
substitution possibilities are enormously rich, both theoretically and practically.
RELATIONAL ANALYSIS
Beyond extending traditional analysis further than the institutions of the
labour market and the state into the household, my claim to novelty is the
relational quality of its analysis. Following C.B. Macpherson’s insight into
property rights, the issue is not the objects of property themselves but the
relations between people in relation to things.
In my case, the three sites of labour markets, welfare states and
households are not studied as institutions, policies or practices. Rather it is the
matrix of relations between these sites that yield our understanding of class,
gender and generation. Class, gender and generation are themselves relational
concepts that are given meaning in terms of how they unfold in the intricacies of
these fundamental relationships. Space and time are crucial to yielding variations
and transformations in these relations. Relations can never be static; they must
continually be sustained and adjusted. They are not the same everywhere; spatial
context matters.
Generation provides a strong reminder of this since it is embedded in
time and life stage, defined relationally. Generation involves the intersection of
individuals with their context. Children are those dependent upon others for
their support; youth are those between sexual maturity and economic
independence; adults are economically independent; the elderly are mature
people retired from labour market dependence. It includes several levels of
analysis: the relative weights of numbers of one set compared to the others: are
there sufficient adults to sustain the others? The relationship between the
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generations: who will care to the children and elderly? The problems of
transition: the conditions for youths to attain economic independence and for the
elderly to attain freedom from the labour market. These are the issues which
engage the focus on my current research.
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